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ABSTRACT 
 Though the Internet and social media are fairly recent developments, the legal principles 
and issues embodied in them are well-represented in the Constitution.  Take, for example, the 
freedom of expression enumerated in the First Amendment.  Though traditionally in print, 
pamphlets, and film, recent developments in technology such as Facebook and blogs have 
become the new standard forms of communication.  Like the physical mediums that arose before 
them, issues arise of what limits, if any, should be placed on the speech.  Given the guise of 
anonymity, people on the Internet have less accountability in the comments they make, which 
has led to things ranging from passionate political speech to what is known as cyber-bullying, 
which is online harassment that has led people to suicide. 
 This thesis, however, will primarily focus on the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  Because the information involved with the Internet and social media is 
digital, it is more difficult to identify when privacy has been breached.  With a paper envelope, 
for example, one can tell if the seal was broken and the contents were potentially disclosed to an 
unwanted party.  Electronically, however, no such seal exists to notify the sender or recipient of 
a communication.   
 Furthermore, the Government has found itself under stricter scrutiny for searches with 
these new developments in technology; the lack of physical intrusion poses difficult questions 
for courts that must decide how far a reasonable expectation of privacy goes in the social media 
age. 
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 The thesis will also address how private companies obtain and use individuals’ 
information through the services they provide and the issues that arise from them.  Private 
companies have fewer restrictions than the Government, and both perspectives are important to 
keep in mind when trying to understand the policy implications rapid technological growth has 
brought about. 
 The thesis will conclude by identifying issues that courts and legislatures will have to 
address in the coming years to adequately deliver justice in a dynamic society that is prone to 
powerful technological change. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The purpose of this thesis is, above all else, to apply a reasonable expectation of privacy 
to the twenty-first century environment of digital content and social media.  New developments 
in technology have made it increasingly difficult for courts to apply legal precedent to new 
issues, even though the fundamental principles behind them are well-established.   
 This thesis will first examine the basics of the Internet and social media.   Without getting 
into overly technical details, it will explain how digital content works, in terms of the 
transmission of information from one user to another and an explanation of the channels in 
between.  It will also look at Federal statutes that apply to these “electronic communications” 
and show how courts have interpreted them with regard to speech, privacy, and piracy.  It will 
then explain the issues surrounding Internet law, such as freedom of speech and privacy, in a 
historical context and show how courts have applied these principles to the Internet.  Once these 
foundations have been established, it will discuss citizens’ protection from the Government, by 
focusing on statutes and criminal cases. 
Printed political pamphlets have been circulating since before this country was founded.  
The First Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press” which, in the context of social media, applies to 
postings on websites such as Facebook or comments on the website of a news organization. 
 It should be noted that free speech is not unlimited; one cannot jokingly scream “fire” in 
a crowded movie theater, for example, because it would disrupt the peace and potentially 
endanger others.  Similarly, one cannot coerce another into committing suicide.  Present on the 
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Internet is what is known as “cyber bullying,” in which one, sometimes anonymously, mocks or 
ridicules another using social media.  One recent example is the case of Dharun Ravi, a Rutgers 
student who used a digital camera attached to a computer known as a “webcam” to take video of 
his roommate, Tyler Clementi, kissing another man.  After discovering this and reading Ravi’s 
twitter feed, which also had derogatory remarks, Clementi committed suicide.  
 A conundrum with digital content, courts have found, is that the lack of physical 
parameters, such as a seal on an envelope or broken window to a home make it difficult to tell if 
one’s privacy has been breached.  Privacy is a well-established concept, but digital content is not 
as simple as physical content under the scrutiny of the courts.  The physical location of a 
computer, for example, is primarily used to establish where a defendant resides, rather than as a 
scene for law enforcement officials to investigate. 
 This thesis will then explain how the Internet and social media have affected civil cases.  
It will explain what consumers can assume is private when services such as Google collect 
information from them.  It will also explain the distinction between content and non-content 
information, as well as how much control one has over the content one posts.  If, for example, a 
user of a photo-sharing service uploads an image to the Internet, does the user still retain rights to 
the image, or have they been forfeited?  The thesis will conclude by addressing the double 
standard users have when giving their information away online to Governmental entities and 
private entities. 
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 The purpose of this thesis is to examine what courts and scholars have found about the 
Internet and social media and to speculate how future courts might address these issues in light 
of the ever-changing dynamic of the Internet. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
 The purpose of this section is to explain some of the technical terminology involving the 
Internet that a lay person may be unfamiliar with.  It will not elaborate on HTML code or any 
technical aspects, but it will provide a foundation for those unfamiliar with technical details how 
the technology works and provide a basic understanding of some common terminology the thesis 
will use.   
A. Internet 
 The Internet is defined as “an electronic communications network that connects computer 
networks and organizational computer facilities around the world.”  In a layman’s terms, this 
means that the Internet is a means for users of a computer to send data to other computers 
through networks.  It is sometimes referred to as the “(world-wide) web,” because of how 
interconnected it has made people. 
 Though initially used for research and military purposes, the Internet has become a tool 
average people use to communicate with each other on a daily basis.  Early forms of web-based 
communication, that still exist today, include forums and chat rooms.  Both of these services 
provide a means for individuals to hold conversations with one another with no geographical 
boundaries and expressing any views they may hold, political or otherwise.  Many of these 
services do not require formal identification; users may choose a username that does not disclose 
their actual identities.  A user connects to the Internet through the use of a browser, which allows 
users with an Internet connection to access websites, which are pages on the Internet that 
individuals can access by specifying the appropriate location.  This location is known as a 
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uniform resource locater (URL) and every website has them.  Without getting too technical, a 
URL tells the web browser where on the Internet the page a user is trying to access is located.  
Websites, browsers, and other electronic services may also store cookies about a user, which are 
“small file[s] or part[s] of a file stored on a World Wide Web user's computer, created and 
subsequently read by a Web site server, and containing personal information (as a user 
identification code, customized preferences, or a record of pages visited).”1  
B. Network 
 A network is a series of connected computers.  They vary in size and can cover an entire 
University or a single building depending on the strength.  Networks are generally wireless, 
using devices such as modems, which connect a computer to the Internet through a cable, and 
routers, which transmit a wireless signal that other computers can use to connect to the Internet.  
A network traditionally has clients, who send requests, and servers, who process the clients’ 
requests. 
C. Peer to Peer 
 Peer to Peer is a type of network that allows users to act as both a client and a server, thus 
bypassing the traditional middleman involved with file-sharing.   These have been increasingly 
scrutinized lately, due to their common use with Internet piracy. 
D. Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
 An Internet service provider is, as the name suggests, a service that provides a user access 
to the Internet, generally for a fee.  It should be noted that in order to provide a customer with 
                                                 
1 “Cookie.” Merriam-Webster. (2011). 
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Internet access, the ISP needs to have information such as their name and physical address, as 
well as an IP address that the ISP issues. 
E. Internet Protocol (IP) Address 
 An Internet Protocol (IP) Address is an identifying number assigned to a device, such as a 
computer, on a network.   
F. Social Media 
 “Social media” refers to services on the Internet that allow people to connect to one 
another in various ways.  Though it can be used for professional or networking purposes, most 
people choose to use social media for personal, recreational use.  This thesis will outline some of 
these services and explain how users’ privacy has been an issue for the courts over the past 
decade or so. 
 One common example is “Twitter.”  Twitter is a service that allows users to post short 
text-based messages that those who “follow” their profile can see.  The messages are visible, 
however, to people who do not follow the user, or even necessarily have a Twitter account of 
their own. 
Another example is Facebook, a popular service in which users create a personalized 
page, known as a profile, through which they can share photos, their location, and any text or 
picture-based content they choose through a method known as “posting.”   This information is 
visible to other users who the poster allows access to their profile known as “friends.” Content 
posted includes “status updates,” where a user posts a message for the user’s friends to see. 
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Though there are millions of users on Facebook from many different countries, users 
have some control over who gets to see the content they post.  The friends allowed to see one’s 
profile, however, have wide discretion over what they share.  So, for example, if a user posts a 
photograph for the user’s friends to see, there is nothing stopping the friends from sharing the 
photograph with parties the original user did not intend to have access.  This concept of shared 
information is not exclusive to digital concepts.   The same principle applies to mailing a 
physical letter; once it reaches its destination, the original sender has no control over who gets to 
see the content. 
G. Speech 
 Though a constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech and expression exists, it 
is not unlimited.  For example, in 1964, in New York Times v. Sullivan,2  for defamation, the 
Supreme Court held that in order to recover damages, a public figure must prove “actual malice.” 
The concept of “actual malice” is a restriction on what individuals are allowed to say about a 
public figure, which leads to difficult questions for modern courts.  If, for example, individuals 
post content on the Internet, making it public information, does it make them a public figure? 
 Furthermore, “obscene” material is not constitutionally protected, as defined by the 
Supreme Court in the 1973 case Miller v. California.3  In this case, the Court created a three-
pronged test to determine what is obscene: “(a) whether ‘the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest. . .(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
                                                 
2 New York Times v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
3 Miller v. California. 413 U.S. 15. (1973). 
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conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a 
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”4   
H. Searches and Seizures 
 The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable 
searches and seizures, although it is up to the courts to determine what is unreasonable.  Though 
the privacy traditionally referred to privacy in one’s own home, new technology has complicated 
the concept.  The reasonableness of a seizure, for example, was traditionally determined by the 
individual’s loss of liberty during the duration of the search.  With digital content, however, a 
government entity searching through an individual’s files may experience no tangible loss of 
liberty during the duration of the search, and the individual may not even be aware of the 
intrusion as it occurs.  Despite the lack of physical inconvenience, however, courts have held that 
individuals do have a reasonable expectation of privacy with their digital files, although it is not 
unlimited.  As the thesis will describe in detail later, the amount of privacy one has with a digital 
file is largely dependent on how the file is obtained, who it is being shared with, and how it is 
being used. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Id. 
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III. PROTECTION FROM GOVERNMENT (CRIMINAL CASES) 
 A growing concern in recent years has been over how much the Government can intrude 
into an individual’s digital content.  Though certain files, such as business and medical records, 
are meant to be private, they are sometimes required for investigations into criminal matters.  
This leads to a balancing act between an individual’s expectation of privacy and the public’s 
interest in adequate law enforcement.  If crimes are being committed on the Internet, law 
enforcement must adapt accordingly.  Furthermore, freedom of speech and expression are crucial 
to a democracy, but threats, for example, generally warrant an investigation to determine if they 
are credible.  The First and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution are restrictions on the 
Federal Government, and apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A. First Amendment 
 The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances” and protects speech as one of our most cherished rights.   
Though originally intended to protect only political speech, courts have consistently expanded 
speech, regardless of whether or not it is digital, printed, or verbal, is constitutionally protected.    
The Supreme Court addressed the Internet specifically in 1997, when Justice Stevens 
noted in his opinion for Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union that, in previous cases, “ [the] 
Court relied on the history of extensive Government regulation of the broadcast medium…the 
scarcity of available frequencies at its inception…and its ‘invasive’ nature,” with regards to the 
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need to regulate television and radio due to concerns of limitations on the ability to connect, such 
as interstate broadcast signals and radio frequencies.5  The Court also upheld the district court 
decision that found no need “for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be 
applied to this medium.” 6 
Those factors are not present in cyberspace.  As the Court noted, “[never before] have the vast 
democratic forums of the Internet been subject to the type of government supervision and 
regulation that has attended the broadcast industry.”7 
 Perhaps the most notorious controversy regarding Internet speech is that of Tyler 
Clementi, a gay student at Rutgers University in who was bullied online by his roommate and 
committed suicide in 2010.  The roommate, Dharun Ravi, used a webcam, which is a digital 
camera attached to a computer, to spy on Clementi engaging in sexual activity with another man 
on two occasions.  Clementi asked to have the room to himself to have a guest over, and Ravi 
used his computer’s webcam to film Clementi while Ravi was out of the room, watching the feed 
from a friend’s room and encouraging his Twitter “followers” to watch the video footage live, 
which is known as a “livestream,” as well.  “Follower,” in the context of Twitter, refers to a user 
who subscribes to, or “follows” another user, and sees the content the user posts.  Clementi was 
among Ravi’s followers and saw the message, and turned the webcam off for his second 
romantic encounter.   After seeing, and saving, some of Ravi’s tweets, Clementi committed 
suicide by jumping off the George Washington Bridge. 
                                                 
5 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union. 521 U.S. 844. (1997). 
6  Id. at Reno 
7  Id. at Reno 
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 This case did not involve a reasonable expectation of privacy protection under the Fourth 
Amendment because Ravi was not an agent of the Government; he was a private individual with 
whom the deceased shared a room.  There were, however, criminal charges brought against Ravi 
by the State of New Jersey.  Although Ravi was within his rights to post messages, known as 
“tweets,” such as “roommate asked for the room until midnight. I went into molly’s room and 
turned on my webcam. I saw him making out with a dude. Yay” or “I dare you to chat me 
between the hours of 9:30 and midnight. Yes, it’s happening again.” Both tweets referred to the 
webcam Ravi left on for others to view Clementi’s sexual encounter and these communications 
were made with malicious intent. Though nothing expressly unlawful was stated, courts must 
address if Ravi’s right to post content outweigh the violation of privacy Clementi experienced. It 
is reasonable to assume that Clementi’s privacy in his place of residence would be the stronger 
interest, but legislatures have yet to codify that sentiment. 
Furthermore, Ravi was found guilty of tampering with physical evidence by deleting his 
tweets and text messages.  The key phrase in this charge was “physical,” because an electronic 
communication is digital, not physical.  Though the same conditions applied, this is a distinction 
that legislatures should address in the near future; if the nature of the evidence is not physical, 
the charge should be distinguished accordingly. 
 This incident occurred in a school setting, and Courts have consistently held that schools 
can restrict students’ speech in certain scenarios according to certain factors. 
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  As Katherine Hokenson notes, “Supreme Court precedent [was] made before the 
Internet.”8  The most famous Supreme Court case dealing with student speech was Tinker v. Des 
Moines, where students wore black armbands to protest the war in Vietnam and were suspended. 
9 On appeal, the Court famously held that “it can hardly be argued that either students or teachers 
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,” 
although it noted that speech can be limited if the action “was caused by something more than a 
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
viewpoint.”10   For example, “1) if the speech materially and substantially interferes with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school, or 2) if it interferes with the 
rights of others,” it can be censored.11 
An example of speech that warranted censorship was the Second Circuit’s Wisniewski 
case, where a middle school student created a violent image with the message “kill Mr. 
VanderMolen,” who was his English teacher at the time, on the Internet from a computer located 
outside of the school and sent it to some of his friends.12  When the teacher in question was made 
aware of the image, the student was disciplined.  In its ruling, the court held that  “the potentially 
threatening content of the icon and the extensive distribution of it, which encompassed 15 
recipients, including some of Aaron's classmates, during a three-week circulation period, made 
this risk at least foreseeable to a reasonable person, if not inevitable. And there can be no doubt 
that the icon, once made known to the teacher and other school officials, would foreseeably 
                                                 
8 Hokenson, Katherine, MY TEACHER SUX! [CENSORED]: PROTECTING STUDENTS' RIGHT TO FREE 
SPEECH ON THE INTERNET. 28 J.Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 385 (2011). 
9 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
10 Id. 
11  Id. 
12 Wisniewski v. Board of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. School Dist.494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment.”13  So, even though the 
electronic speech was not made on school grounds, the fact that it had the potential to disrupt 
school operations gave the school board authority. 
Universities, however, are not necessarily bound by the same restrictions as lower 
institutions.  If, for example, Rutgers provided the Internet access to Clementi and Ravi, who 
lived in the dorms, should they have monitored the postings more carefully?  Though monitoring 
students’ Internet activity may have prevented this particular tragedy, society may not be willing 
to accept this practice as a solution It is too early to tell how legislatures and courts will rule on 
this particular issue, but a reasonable method would be to treat the University that provides 
Internet access the same way as an ISP, which diminishes an individual’s expectation of privacy 
but does not diminish it completely. 
B. Anonymity 
An important issue that complicates Internet privacy law is the concept of anonymity.  
The Supreme Court held in a 1960 case, Talley v. California, that “anonymous pamphlets, 
leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind. 
Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize 
oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all.”14  In Talley, the Court discussed 
the constitutionality of distributing political pamphlets that did not have the author’s name or 
information and held that speech is protected regardless of whether the author takes credit for the 
work.  Further, in Reno, the Court also held that “this dynamic, multifaceted category of 
                                                 
13 Id. at Wisniewski 
14 Talley v. California. 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
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communication includes not only traditional print and news services, but also audio, video, and 
still images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any person 
with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from 
any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same 
individual can become a pamphleteer.”15 
Thus, this same principle of freedom of expression applies to the Internet.  Because it has 
been held that the Internet is protected, any anonymous speech on the Internet is held to the same 
standard as conventional speech, which means that an individual in a forum or chat room does 
not lose First Amendment protection because an individual’s username does not reveal personal 
information.  As the thesis will address later, however, law enforcement has legal methods of 
obtaining warrants to reveal an anonymous user’s personal information through their ISP. 
C. Fourth Amendment 
 Most crucial to this thesis is the Fourth Amendment, which protects “the right of 
the people to be secure…against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  The Supreme Court has 
since interpreted this to guarantee a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”16  Though it 
traditionally applies to physical locations, such as one’s home, person, or vehicle, several 
jurisdictions have established that this expectation still exists with electronic communications 
and digital content such as files, though this expectation is diminished due to several factors.   
One such factor is that any information communicated over the Internet is not exclusive 
to a user’s computer, in that it is accomplished via a network by definition.  Furthermore, an 
                                                 
15 Id. at Reno 
16 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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internet user’s ISP sees the information in the process of sending it to the intended server, so it is 
not strictly private. 
One method of determining whether there is an expectation of privacy is through making 
the distinction between content and non-content information.  As Stanford Professor Orin Kerr 
explained, “online, non-content surveillance is usually surveillance related to identity, location, 
and time; content surveillance is surveillance of private thoughts and speech.”17  Kerr further 
explained how the very function of networks promotes this theory:  “communications networks 
are mechanisms for delivering contents that would otherwise have to be delivered in person, and 
the non-content information on the network is the information needed to deliver the 
communication that substitutes for the public act of delivering contents.”18   
The rationale behind this theory is similar to mailing a physical letter through the postal 
service.  To mail a letter, one must postmark it and state a return address and the address to 
which it is being sent.  Under Kerr’s theory, this information would be non-content, which in the 
context of the internet would be the parties’ name and subscriber information, such as ISP and 
physical address.   The statements in the letter itself, on the other hand, would be content 
information. The letter, like the information in an electronic communication, “isn’t handled by 
the Post Office; the contents are of no concern to the Post Office, as the contents are only the 
concern of the sender and receiver.”19  As the Sixth Circuit noted in Warshak, “given the 
                                                 
17 Kerr, Orin. Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach. 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1005. (2010). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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fundamental similarities between email and traditional forms of communication, it would defy 
common sense to afford emails lesser Fourth Amendment protection.”20 
Furthermore, an individual’s address is not private information, because anybody with a 
phone book can look up someone’s personal information.  Simply knowing the location of a 
person’s residence, however, does not give one the right to invade the person’s personal 
belongings and see items in their home.  This is known as the inside-outside distinction.  As Kerr 
noted, watching somebody drive home and seeing where they park the car is outside information; 
it is simply information about the person’s whereabouts. 
Inside information, on the other hand, is the functional equivalent of content information.  
Using the example of somebody’s house, inside information would consist of a person’s 
belongings inside the home.  Some inside information may be visible, just as items sitting on a 
desk by an open window might be visible to a passerby.  But just as storing an item in a drawer 
or a room with no windows increases the expectation of privacy of an item, “storing the file on a 
password-protected server is the virtual equivalent of keeping it in a home.” 21 
It should be noted that the reasonable expectation of privacy only exists until the 
information reaches its intended recipients.  Once an e-mail reaches its intended recipient(s), for 
example, the sender no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy because those receiving 
the content are free to disclose its contents to others, assuming that no legal duty of 
confidentiality exists that would otherwise protect the contents from exposure.  This is the 
equivalent of somebody making a photocopy of a letter that they receive and handing copies out 
                                                 
20 U.S. v. Warshak. 631 F.3d 266 (2011). 
21 Id. At Kerr 
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to others, because the original sender has no control over what the recipient does with the 
content.  
D. Electronic Communication Statutes 
 In addition to the protections afforded by the, Congress has created a criminal statute that 
further limit the government’s ability to intrude on an individual’s privacy, The Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”) sets guidelines for how digital information may 
be intercepted and used as evidence in court. 
 First and foremost, the statutory definition of “electronic communication” under federal 
law is “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature 
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical 
system that affects interstate or foreign commerce.”22 This statute also defines a user as “any 
person or entity who uses an electronic communication service and is duly authorized by the 
provider of such service to engage in such use.” Furthermore, “electronic communications 
system” is defined as “any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic facilities 
for the transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any computer facilities or related 
electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such communications.”23  An “electronic 
communication service” is defined as “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to 
send or receive wire or electronic communications.”24 
Additionally, a “computer trespasser” is defined as “a person who accesses a protected 
computer without authorization and thus has no reasonable expectation of privacy in any 
                                                 
22 18 U.S.C § 2510 (2006 & Supp. 2012). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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communication transmitted to, through, or from the protected computer; and does not include a 
person known by the owner or operator of the protected computer to have an existing contractual 
relationship with the owner or operator of the protected computer for access to all or part of the 
protected computer.”25 
The ECPA states that not all electronic communications are meant to be private.26 A 
user’s post in an online chat room that other users can view, for example, would not be protected 
by the Act, because posting in such a manner waives any expectation of privacy.  Title 18 U.S.C 
§ 2511 also imposes a fine or imprisonment for no more than five years, or both for anyone who 
“intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or 
endeavor to intercept, any…electronic communication [and] uses…any electronic, mechanical, 
or other device to intercept any oral communication.”27 
Later statutes in the ECPA dictate some exceptions, such as having a warrant signed by a 
judge, but, as a general rule, “intentionally disclosing or endeavoring to disclose, to any other 
person the contents of [an] electronic communication, [or knowing] that the information was 
obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this 
subsection” is a crime.28  Furthermore, anybody who discloses the contents of an unlawfully 
intercepted electronic communication is also subject to penalties. 
Though electronic communications are not physical in nature, the devices that intercept 
them are. The next statute in the ECPA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2512, regulates the manufacture, 
distribution, possession, and advertising of wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepting 
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devices and prohibits individuals from manufacturing or mailing devices if  “the design of such 
device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of…electronic 
communications.”29 
 The statute makes exceptions for “[providers] of wire or electronic communication 
service or an officer, agent, or employee of, or a person under contract with, such a provider, in 
the normal course of the business of providing that wire or electronic communication service, “ 
as well as “an officer, agent, or employee of, or a person under contract with, the United States, a 
State, or a political subdivision thereof, in the normal course of the activities of the United 
States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof,” who are permitted under this statute “to send 
through the mail, send or carry in interstate or foreign commerce, or manufacture, assemble, 
possess, or sell any electronic, mechanical, or other device knowing or having reason to know 
that the design of such device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious 
interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications.”30 
 Furthermore, “[it is not] unlawful under this section to advertise for sale a device 
described in subsection (1) of this section if the advertisement is mailed, sent, or carried in 
interstate or foreign commerce solely to a domestic provider of wire or electronic 
communication service or to an agency of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision 
thereof which is duly authorized to use such device.” 31  The ECPA also authorizes the 
confiscation of devices “used, sent, carried, manufactured, assembled, possessed, sold, or 
advertised” that violate the earlier sections.32 
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 Though the government does have the authority to confiscate devices involved, 
“whenever any…communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of such 
communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any [criminal 
proceeding].”33 
 Furthermore, the government does not have unlimited discretion in what it intercepts.  
The ECPA outlines the scenarios in which law enforcement is authorized to intercept electronic 
communications.  A federal judge, for example, “may grant…an order authorizing or approving 
the interception of…communications by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or [another 
Government Agency] if certain conditions are met.”34 This does not apply to all offenses, but 
some applicable criminal offenses are violent crimes, counterfeit, or any communications 
involving the location of a fugitive. 
 Just because a law enforcement officer knows the content of an electronic communication 
does not mean that the information is admissible in court.   The officer may, however, “disclose 
such contents to another investigative or law enforcement officer [if such disclosure is relevant to 
the scope of their duties].”35  Furthermore, “any Federal official who receives information 
pursuant to this provision may use that information only as necessary in the conduct of that 
person's official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such 
information.”36  
 The ECPA then goes into detail about the procedure of intercepting these 
communications in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518.  Any law enforcement official who wants to intercept an 
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electronic or digital communication to help an investigation must provide the individual’s name 
and the nature of the crime they suspect is about to be committed, is being committed, or has 
been committed.  An officer cannot, for example, simply search an individual’s computer on a 
hunch.  The officer must articulate a clear reason to the judge issuing the warrant and explain the 
facts and measures up to that point in order to have a legal search. 
 Furthermore, the searches authorized under the statute are very limited in scope.  An 
officer may not “authorize or approve the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the 
authorization, nor in any event longer than thirty days.”37  Judges must also create reports 
detailing the type of orders granted, as well as their results.38 
 The ECPA only regulates law enforcement obtaining access to these electronic 
communications.   There are, however, additional laws that address unauthorized access to 
electronic communications, known as the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”).  Under this Act, 
“whoever intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic 
communication service is provided or intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that 
facility” shall be fined or given prison time.  Furthermore, an individual who works for an 
internet service provider is prohibited from disclosing the contents of communications the 
individual works with while performing the job.39  For example, if somebody is repairing a 
company’s server and sees a user’s communications, the employee is not allowed to disclose the 
contents, even though the employee came upon them legally.   
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This prohibition may be waived by the sender or intended recipient of the 
communication, disclosed to the provider of the service if it is necessary to the rendition of that 
service or to a law enforcement or government entity if “the provider, in good faith, believes that 
an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires 
disclosure without delay of communications relating to the emergency.”40  An example of this 
last exception would be if somebody lawfully executing their duties as a service provider notices 
a threat of violence that they believe to be credible, because society’s interest of preventing 
serious harm outweighs an expectation of privacy if it can stop a serious crime from being 
committed.   
This rationale applies to private individuals working as service providers.  The 
government may not simply access a provider’s records to look for violent threats.  If the 
government have reason to believe there is a crime about to be committed, they must obtain a 
warrant as per 18 U.S.C. § 2518. 
 Providers may, however, be required to disclose electronic communications if certain 
conditions are met.  For example, if a warrant is issued pursuant to 18 U.S. C. § 2518, the 
warrant will be served to the service provider in order to obtain the access, without letting the 
owner of the contents know.41 The providers under this statute are required to disclose an 
individual’s name, address, records pertaining to use of the service, telephone number or IP 
address, and means of payment for the service.   This is common in Internet piracy cases, where 
individuals download content, such as music or movies, illegally at no cost. 
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 In ACHTE, for example, individuals who downloaded music over the Internet were given 
notice by their ISPs that their identifying information had been requested.42  Upon being given 
subpoenas with the IP address of their computers, along with the date and time they were alleged 
to have used the Internet to download or upload the particular movie, the defendants filed 
motions to quash the subpoenas.43  The motions were denied, because the information requested 
was given in a lawful manner.  The distribution company had a lawful claim of ownership over 
the digital content, and the individuals did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with 
regard to their non-content information. 
 Furthermore, as the U.S. District Court held in First Time Videos, “alleged [copyright] 
infringers’ First Amendment right to anonymous speech on the Internet [was not more 
compelling than the] right of [owners] of adult videos and photographs to use the judicial process 
to pursue its prima facie copyright infringement claims by serving the subpoenas on alleged 
infringers’ [ISP to obtain identifying information].”44  The Court held that the identifying 
information is not privileged or confidential enough to quash a warrant, and that their First 
Amendment right to expression in the context of downloading files does not outweigh First Time 
Video’s “claim of actual harm under a theory of copyright infringement.”45 
 It should be noted that the information, as stated earlier, is given by the user to the 
service provider to access the Internet, so it is the service provider disclosing the information to 
the law enforcement agency, not the user.  Because the user does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy with information the users give to the service provider, the service 
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provider disclosing the information to a government agency does not violate the user’s Fourth 
Amendment expectation of privacy. This concept is crucial for Internet piracy cases. 
 An interesting distinction regarding these warrants or court orders and traditional ones is 
that an officer’s presence is not required to execute the warrant, while with a traditional search 
warrant an officer would go to the location specified and execute the warrant in person.46 
 These statutes can also be problematic with regard to the Fourth Amendment. In 
Warshak, for example, the Sixth Circuit held that a violation of the an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy does not necessarily mean that evidence is not admissible in court.  In this 
case, Warshak “enjoyed [a] reasonable expectation of privacy in his e-mails vis-a-vis his Internet 
service provider (ISP) and government agents violated his Fourth Amendment rights by 
compelling ISP to turn over email without first obtaining warrant based on probable cause,” but, 
”because agents relied in good faith on provisions of [the SCA],[the] exclusionary rule did not 
apply.”  In simpler terms, this means that unlawfully obtained electronic communications are not 
always make the inadmissible as evidence and good-faith exceptions apply just as they do with 
physical evidence.   
E. Ontario v. Quon 
The Supreme Court addressed the reasonableness of searching electronic 
communications for government employees in the 2010 case Ontario v. Quon.47  In Quon, the 
Court addressed a law enforcement officer’s reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to 
messages on his work-provided cell phone.   
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 In this case, Quon was a member of the Ontario, California police department, which had 
a contract with Arch Wireless, which provided the department mobile service that, contractually, 
had a “monthly limit on the characters each pager could send or receive,” and if a pager went 
over its character limit, there would be a fee.48  As government employees, members of the 
department were subject to the City’s “Computer Usage, Internet, and E-mail Policy” that went 
into effect before the pagers were distributed.   This policy stated that the City “reserves the right 
to monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or without notice. 
Users should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources,” and 
Quon signed a statement acknowledging that he had read and understood the policy.49   
 Though the policy did not outline text messages explicitly, Lieutenant Steven Duke, the 
officer responsible for the contract with Arch Wireless, told Quon and other officers that 
messages sent on the pagers would be treated as e-mails and were, thus, subject to audit.   The 
significance of this distinction is that text messages were transmitted through Arch Wireless’ 
radio station frequencies from an individual pager while e-mails were sent through the City’s 
own data servers.50 
 After going over his character limit on several occasions, Quon’s messages were audited 
by Chief Scharf, his superior, in order to determine if the City needed to increase its monthly 
character limit for the pagers.  Lt. Duke, the individual responsible for conducting the audit, 
“reviewed the transcripts and discovered that many of the messages sent and received on Quon’s 
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pager were not work related, and some were sexually explicit.”51  After the police department’s 
internal affairs division was notified of this conduct, Quon was disciplined. 
 Quon alleged that his Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy was violated 
when his text messages were audited, arguing that the audits were unwarranted because he paid 
all of the overage fees himself.  He also alleged that Arch Wireless violated 18 U.S.C.A. § 2701 
by disclosing the contents of his messages. 
 The issue was whether or not the search was reasonable, and the Court held that it was.   
It had been previously held in O’Connor v. Ortega that “individuals do not lose Fourth 
Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private 
employer.”52  In his concurring opinion to Quon, Justice Scalia wrote that “government searches 
to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules—searches of the 
sort that are regarded as reasonable in the private-employer context—do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.”53  Furthermore, the City’s policy made it clear that the messages on the pagers 
were not to be considered private and could be audited at any time.  The Court held that 
“reviewing the transcripts was reasonable because it was an efficient and expedient way to 
determine whether Quon’s overages were the result of work-related messaging or personal use,” 
and was not “excessively intrusive.”54  Furthermore, the Court held, “it may have been 
reasonable as well…to review transcripts of all the months in which Quon exceeded his 
allowance, it was certainly reasonable…to review messages for just two months in order to 
obtain a large enough sample to decide whether the character limits were efficacious,” which is 
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reinforced by the fact that all of Quon’s off-duty messages were redacted.55  The Court also 
found that “because the search was motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose, and because 
it was not excessive in scope…it was reasonable.56 
 Justice Kennedy, who wrote the opinion, explicitly noted how the effect of new 
technology on law is complicated.  For example, he wrote, “rapid changes in the dynamics of 
communication and information transmission are [evidenced] not just in the technology itself but 
in what society accepts as proper behavior.”57  He reinforced this point by quoting amici briefs 
which noted that employers’ acceptance, and even expectation, that employees use mobile 
devices such as pagers because they can often increase worker efficiency.  The Ontario police 
department in Quon, for example, got the pagers as a way for SWAT members to communicate 
quickly and effectively on the job.  Kennedy also wrote that “cell phone and text message 
communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means or 
necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification,” a point that can either 
strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy,” or, conversely, that their affordability could 
mean that employees should be responsible for obtaining their own mobile devices for personal 
use.58 
 Quon raises issues that courts will have to address in the near future in order to adapt 
existing law to our rapidly changing society.  If mobile technology such as cell phones are truly 
as accessible and prevalent as Kennedy implies, courts must decide how far a reasonable 
expectation of privacy goes.  In O’Connor, the Court held that “the question of whether an 
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employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis,” 
but this approach could create too many issues for courts to handle-- a framework must be 
established so that the average, reasonable person can be educated as to how far their privacy 
rights go.59  This is especially important because Kerr’s content, non-content distinction is not 
codified; it is simply an approach that one may use to interpret existing law. 
 It is also difficult to say whether the Courts or Congress should be responsible for 
addressing these issues.  Though Congress has written statutes that deal with electronic 
communications and privacy, there are still many issues for Courts to address.   
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IV. PROTECTION FROM OTHERS (CIVIL CASES) 
 Because the Constitution and statutes only apply to government actors and most digital 
content is given to a service provider, there are also civil legal issues pertaining to the Internet 
that must be addressed.  Furthermore, while Internet users have little expectation of privacy with 
the information they provide, they maintain some control over how the information is shared. 
 It should be noted that many ISPs and web-based service providers have terms of service 
and privacy policies that users must agree to.  Some of these terms of service address how a 
user’s information will be used.  In one such example, the Court addressed an individual’s 
expectation of privacy with regard to his e-mail.  In the majority opinion, the Court held that  
the defendant was “afforded more privacy than similar messages on the Internet, because [his e-
mails were] privately stored for retrieval on AOL's centralized and privately-owned computer 
bank.”60  Furthermore, AOL's policy was not to read or disclose subscribers' e-mail to anyone 
except authorized users, which gave additional privacy protection in addition to any federal 
statutory protections and it was AOL's practice to guard these “private communications” and 
only disclose them to third parties if given a court order.61   Kennedy also wrote that “while 
implicit promises or contractual guarantees of privacy by commercial entities do not guarantee a 
constitutional expectation of privacy, we conclude that under the circumstances here appellant 
possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy, albeit a limited one, in the e-mail messages that 
he sent and/or received on AOL. Expectations of privacy, however, have limitations, and this 
case illustrates some of them.”62 
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It should also be noted that the location of the server is not generally an issue in these 
cases, because the Government contacts the service provider directly for access to electronic 
communications.  Furthermore, Maxwell was a military case; there are different procedural rules 
to the average individual, but the legal reasoning behind it is still relevant.  
 There are, however, cases where the physical location of the computer is material.   
Whether or not a student’s statement was made using a school computer, for example, could give 
jurisdiction over online content, but the concept is not limited to students. In White v. White, for 
example, a New Jersey Court addressed a divorce case where the wife accessed her husband’s e-
mails on a computer in their home.63  After finding a letter from her husband’s girlfriend, White 
hired an investigator.  The investigator copied files from the computer’s hard drive and sent 
copies of the electronic communications to White and her attorney.  It is important to note, 
however, that they did not actually access her husband’s password-protected America Online 
(AOL) account to get this information, but rather accessed e-mails that were saved on the 
computer.  
 This was possible because AOL allows users to save e-mails, once they have logged into 
their password-protected account, to their computer for offline access.  The case was decided in 
2001, when Internet connection was primarily dial-up, a method that was not as readily available 
or convenient as wireless networks are today.  As an expert witness testified, “[an] AOL user 
must voluntarily choose to save the e-mail, attachment or address to his [computer].  The AOL 
user can save e-mail, attachments or addresses either by using the automatic AOL feature or 
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manually.”64   Though the AOL account is password-protected, the saved e-mails do not have 
password-protection by default; they can be accessed from a user’s computer without using a 
password.  Because White did not unlawfully use her husband’s password to access the content, 
his expectation of privacy was not violated. 
 The physical location of the computer was also relevant to the analysis because it was in 
the family’s sun room, which White and her children had access to and utilized often.  Her 
husband, the Court held, had no reasonable expectation of privacy for files saved on the hard 
drive of a computer that other people have access to and are not password-protected.  If White 
had used her husband’s password to access the files, rather than accessing the files on the family 
computer, then she would have violated the SCA.  
 Furthermore, the expectation of privacy diminished when an e-mail was sent; once the 
file was saved on a computer that others had access to, those others could access them lawfully.  
If the husband had password-protected the files on the hard drive, then there would have been a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, because a password on a computer is the functional equivalent 
of a lock and key on a file cabinet. 
A. Google 
 Google, founded in 1998 by Larry Page and Sergey Brin, is one of the largest Internet-
based companies in the world.  Though it started as a crawler-based search engine, which is a 
website where a user inputs a phrase or topic and the search engine finds websites that has those 
terms, it has since expanded to include a social media platform, mobile applications, and 
                                                 
64 Id. 
33 
 
electronic mail.  As a premier Internet-based company, many issues that have arisen in recent 
years have been through Google’s services.   
 Such is the case with Google Buzz, a social media platform.  Before going into detail 
about this service, one must understand the interconnectivity between Google’s services.  By 
making an account with Google, a user has access to several different features including 
electronic mail, YouTube, which is a popular video sharing service, Google Chrome, which is a 
web browser, and many others.  Google’s current social media platform, Google+, has addressed 
many of these issues, largely due to the problems encountered by its predecessor. 
 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was established in 1914 to prevent anti-
competitive business practices, and its jurisdiction has since expanded to include the authority to 
punish companies for using “misleading and deceptive practices” to exploit consumers over the 
Internet.  In 2012, the FTC issued a complaint against Google for a controversy surrounding a 
social networking service called “Google Buzz,” which allowed user to follow people they had 
in their contact book with Gmail, Google’s electronic mail service.   When Google Buzz was 
first implemented, Gmail users were given options to opt-out of the new service, but there was 
still a tab for Google Buzz in their inbox.  Clicking the tab, even by mistake, would cause a user 
to “be taken to the Buzz welcome screen and automatically enrolled in Buzz, without any 
disclosure of that fact and without any further action.”65  Though users from October 2004 to 
October 2010 were given notice that “Gmail stores, processes and maintains your messages, 
contact lists and other data related to your account in order to provide the service to you,” 
information about how Google would use the information was not provided until October 2005, 
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when the company added “when you sign up for a particular service that requires registration, we 
ask you to provide personal information. If we use this information in a manner different than the 
purpose for which it was collected, then we will ask for your consent prior to such use,” to its 
privacy policy.66  The issue this presented for users was that contacts they had previously 
blocked from seeing their personal information in Gmail were able to see that information in 
Buzz.  In addition to people blocked in Gmail, users without public Google profiles or those who 
did not provide their first and last name when setting up their Google account could not be 
blocked.  Among the information available to followers on Google Buzz was a list of contacts, 
which many clients need to be confidential.  
 The visibility of personal information to unauthorized parties is particularly problematic 
for users such as doctors and attorneys, whose contacts include clients that value confidentiality.   
In addition to professionals, some users had clients such as ex-husbands with restraining orders 
against them, who were able to get more information about their ex-spouse through the Google 
Buzz profile.67  
 Though Google eventually remedied the situation by adding features that allowed users to 
keep their information more private, such as by being able to block any follower, even if they did 
not have a profile, it violated federal law, as written by the FTC, for its “misleading and 
deceptive practices.”  The option “nah, go to my inbox,” that was given to users on the day 
Google launched its Buzz service, according to the FTC, meant that users had “represented, 
expressly or by implication, that [users] who clicked on these options would not be enrolled in 
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Buzz.”68  Users who selected this option and later clicked the Buzz tab would still be enrolled in 
the service.  Furthermore, the FTC found the method of disabling Buzz once a user had been 
enrolled was complicated, and many users were unable to opt-out of the service once they had 
been enrolled.  In addition to the FTC Act, Google had violated its own privacy policy to 
consumers; users were told that their information would only be stored and used to improve their 
Gmail experience and that if it were to be used for any other purposes, Google would ask for 
their consent.69  Since many users were automatically enrolled in Buzz, there was no express 
consent for many users. Since Buzz went beyond the scope of an electronic mail and messaging 
service because others could see a user’s information, Google was ultimately forced to modify its 
privacy policy and take steps to ensure that users had greater awareness and control over what 
information would be shared and how it would be used, or else they would face fines.70 
 As a result of the FTC’s actions, Google’s current privacy policy is now divided into two 
parts: information that the user provides and information that Google gets through the use of 
their services.  For example, giving identifying information to create a profile that allows a user 
to utilize Google’s services such as name, phone number, credit card number, or photograph 
would fall under the former category.  Information covered by the latter would include search 
terms a user inputs into Google’s search engine, or location if a user is using a Google 
application on a mobile device.   
This use of a middleman diminishes an individual’s expectation of privacy.  Google is 
not an ISP, but it does provide an internet-based service.  The distinction is significant because 
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Google does not provide access to the Internet, but rather provide services to users who already 
have an internet connection.  For example, if an individual uses Comcast as the service provider 
and Google Chrome as their web-browser, both Comcast and Google have access to the 
information a user posts and their online activities, as well as any cookies that might have been 
saved. 
Returning to Google’s privacy policy, it is stated that “Google does not rent, sell or share 
information that personally identifies you for marketing purposes without your express 
permission.71 No email content or other personally identifiable information is provided to 
advertisers.” This raises an important concept-- express permission.  It should be noted that users 
must agree to these policies in order to use Google’s services, so it is crucial that a user 
understands how Google uses the information it collects. 
Google outlines how the information it collects from users, such as IP address, location, 
and search queries is used.  They use the information they collect from their services to “provide, 
maintain, protect and improve them, to develop new ones, and to protect Google and its users” 
and use this information to personalize the content a user sees.72 
Furthermore, they reserve the right to use the name a user provides for their Google 
Profile for other services that require an account. They may show a user’s publicly visible 
information, such as their name and photo if other users already have their email or other 
identifying information. 
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Their policy also outlines how they use information collected from cookies and other 
technologies.  As it states, for example, “by saving [a user’s] language preferences, [Google’s] 
services appear in the language [they] prefer.” 73  They also consolidate information from their 
services to maximize a user’s interactivity with other users of their services.  Google’s policy 
also assures users that “[Google] will [obtain a user’s] consent before using information for a 
purpose other than those that are set out in this Privacy Policy.”74 
It is important that users have discretion over what information is shared with companies 
such as Google through methods such as personalizing their profiles to not include sensitive 
information and disabling their browser from storing cookies.  Furthermore, user accounts are 
password-protected. 
B. Facebook 
 Facebook is probably the most popular social media tool that people use on a regular 
basis, and perhaps the easiest to understand in terms of data.  Since, like Google Plus, users 
create a personalized profile for themselves, some of the basic information collected about a user 
is submitted expressly by the user themselves when creating their profile and agreeing to the 
terms of service. 
Facebook also has a privacy policy that controls how a user’s information is obtained and 
can be shared.  Like Google, users of Facebook voluntarily submit personal information, but may 
not always be aware of how the services use it.  A user’s birthday, for example, “allows 
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[Facebook] to do things like show you age-appropriate content and advertisements.”75  This 
practice is a relatively new phenomenon, but one that brings about complicates issues and 
implications.  With such a vast array of information about their users, Facebook is able to 
personalize the advertisements a user sees based on things like their location and common 
activities. 
Because it is accessible from mobile devices such as cell phones, Facebook “[receives] 
data from the computer, mobile phone or other device [used] to access Facebook, including when 
multiple users log in from the same device. This may include [an] IP address and other 
information about things like [a user’s] internet service, location, the type (including identifiers) 
of browser [one uses], or the pages [a user visits].”76  As the policy outlines, the GPS 
information is sometimes used to let a user know if their “friends” are near them.  
Users are able to post pictures and videos from their mobile devices to Facebook, which 
is one of the most popular features, but some may not be aware that they are also giving 
Facebook “additional related data […] such as the time, date, and place [the user] took the photo 
or video.”77  For example, if a user takes a photograph in a park on their mobile phone, Facebook 
will not only have that photograph, but also the location of the park as well as which of the user’s 
“friends” are in the area. 
Though no current legislation exists to address this issue, Senator Al Franken of 
Minnesota introduced a bill that has yet to pass called the “Location Privacy Protection Act of 
2012,” which would require non-governmental entities such as Facebook or an advertiser to 
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expressly tell a user if the user’s GPS location is being tracked by the device or application and 
how the information will be used.78  The bill is still in committee. 
Though these data-collecting practices might seem unethical, they are clearly outlined in 
the data policy, which states “[sometimes Facebook gets] data from…affiliates or…advertising 
partners, customers and other third parties that helps…deliver ads, understand online activity, 
and generally make Facebook better.”   Advertisers, for example may provide Facebook 
information about users, such as a summary of the advertisements they click, “in order to 
measure the effectiveness of - and improve the quality of – ads.”79 
An important distinction to make about this information as opposed to the Government’s 
access to electronic communications is that these are voluntary services, even if a user is not 
familiar with the terms they agreed to in order to make the account.  So, for example, 
information people might want to hide from a law enforcement officer, such as daily activities 
and locations, is often voluntarily disclosed through Facebook and other social media.   Even 
though users have a diminished expectation of privacy for information on the Internet, users 
must be careful about what they post.  Though a user can customize their security settings to 
limit who can see what they post, there are drawbacks to having anybody able to access this 
information if a user wishes to keep it private. 
Using the content and non-content letter analogy, a Facebook post that is made available 
for others to see has no expectation of privacy.  Even if a user has very strict privacy settings, 
anybody who has access to the user’s profile and posts can legally send the information to a law 
                                                 
78 S. 1223--112th Congress: Location Privacy Protection Act of 2012.” www.GovTrack.us. 2011. 
<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s1223> 
79 Id. at Facebook 
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enforcement agency just as they would be able to make a copy of a physical letter that they 
received in the mail.  Once a letter is sent, or a post is made on Facebook, a reasonable 
expectation of privacy all but vanishes. 
It is possible for a user to delete their Facebook account, but that takes approximately one 
month.   Once an account is deleted, the information may appear in Facebook’s backup copies 
and logs for an additional ninety days, but that is limited to the information that a user expressly 
provides, such as name and demographic information.  Other content, such as posts a user made 
in a group or message sent to one of their “friends” through Facebook, will not be deleted 
because the other party or parties who were given access to this communication will still have 
access to the communications.  
C. Ownership of Content 
 The thesis has outlined the distinction between content and non-content information, but 
it is unclear if they retain ownership of that content once it is shared on the Internet  If, for 
example, a user uploads a photograph using a service such as Facebook, that service may retain 
the right to that content. 
 Facebook’s data use policy refers to information that a user posts as “public,” which a 
reasonable person could construe to imply a forfeiture of ownership.  An educated guess as to 
how far an individual can retain ownership to the content would depend on who has access to it.  
If a photograph taken with a cell phone is sent directly to a user’s computer and is never posted 
on the Internet, there can be a reasonable expectation of privacy.  If a user posts a picture to 
Facebook for others to see, that expectation would be diminished.  It is not being used for 
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commercial purposes, and any other Facebook user with access to the content is able to 
download the photograph and post it elsewhere.  Furthermore, Facebook has an option called 
“share,” which allows users to re-post somebody else’s content, although the original poster is 
given credit.   This language does not explicitly state where the ownership of content ends, and 
Courts must address the boundaries. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 Considering that there is so much information about individuals on the Internet, it is 
interesting that people tend to have a double standard about privacy when the service provided is 
for their own convenience.  With cell phones and other mobile devices that have Internet access, 
users are more than willing to allow private companies to track their location, but there are 
statutory protections that stop the Government from doing that.  If, for example, a law 
enforcement agency were to ask a user for an individual’s name, address, demographic 
information, and photographs, the average person would be uncomfortable complying unless 
they had a legal obligation to do so.  When Facebook asks for this information, on the other 
hand, users are willing to post their personal information for the world to see. 
 It is too early in the social media age to tell exactly why this is, but an educated guess 
would be that GPS and social media services provide an automatic convenience to individuals, 
whereas many people have a fundamental mistrust of Government.  Since many younger 
individuals are used to this technology and feel comfortable divulging so much information, it is 
appropriate to consider disclosing personal information from the angle of a reasonable 
expectation of distribution rather than privacy.  It is interesting to note that people are willing to 
give their information to private entities, but hesitant to give it to the Government, which has 
much greater restrictions than social media platforms.  It is also too early to tell if the fact that so 
much information about us is productive or destructive to society.  Communication and 
commerce are certainly more open than ever before, but there is a growing concern that people 
are getting too detached from reality by having so much focus on their digital presence.  
Employers and schools look at people’s social media presence when making decisions of who to 
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hire or admit, so people need to be cognizant of the fact that information they post can 
potentially stay on the Internet forever, and that once somebody else has access to the content 
they post, their expectation of privacy is severely diminished, if not destroyed. 
 Courts thus far have addressed the issue of privacy to a degree, but there are still 
concepts, such as ownership of digital content, that must be addressed in greater detail and 
codified.  Simply put, the greatest digital expectation of privacy exists when an individual saves 
a file on a physical hard drive or disk and puts a password on it, just as somebody would put an 
important physical document in a locked drawer or cabinet.  If that individual then e-mails that 
file to a friend or colleague, they have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the content of the 
e-mail until it is received, but their Internet Service Provider and web browser have access to the 
identifying information of all the parties, because they are the means by which digital content is 
sent.  Furthermore, once the receiving party has access to the content, the sender’s expectation of 
privacy is gone.  The recipient is able to redistribute the information as the recipient sees fit, 
unless some sort of legal duty of confidentiality applies.  The Government can obtain search 
warrants from ISPs to find identifying information, and ISPs can sometimes divulge customers’ 
information to the Government. 
 Outside of our expectation of privacy from Government intrusion, individuals have a lot 
of discretion in terms of the information they post.  All social media and mobile technology is 
completely voluntary.  Though people are concerned about the amount of information about 
them that is available online, they are generally the ones to provide that information in the first 
place.  The issue at the heart of this phenomenon is essentially a question of how much we as a 
society are willing to sacrifice privacy in exchange for convenience.  Being able to bring up 
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directions through a GPS in one’s phone is an incredibly convenient technological breakthrough, 
but it may not worth the cost of allowing oneself to be monitored at all times.  It is too early to 
answer that question, but it is still perfectly reasonable to expect courts and legislatures to 
address these issues as they arise and continue to follow them.  The Internet is very dynamic by 
nature, and traditional precedent may not always apply, and the legal community as a whole 
must stay vigilant in following legal developments to assist their clients, constitutions, and 
fellow citizens. 
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